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尼克松访华40年后：美中经济关系的进步、挑战和机遇
2012.03.26
美国国务院负责经济、能源和农业事务的副国务卿
罗伯特•霍马茨（Robert Hormats）
在亚洲协会(Asia Society)的讲话
2012年3月6日
纽约
State’s Hormats on 40th Anniversary of Nixon’s Visit to China
06 March 2012
U.S. Department of State
Remarks by Robert D. Hormats
Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs
Asia Society
New York City
March 6, 2012
Forty Years After the Nixon Visit: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities in U.S.-China Economic Relations
As prepared for delivery
I am so pleased to join you tonight to mark a historic event – the 40th anniversary of President Richard Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China.
我非常高兴今晚与各位共同庆祝一个历史性事件——理查德•尼克松（Richard Nixon）总统访问中华人民共和国40周年。
I want to thank the Asia Society and Orville Schell for this tremendous opportunity.
Images of President Nixon meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai in 1972 are etched in the American consciousness for those who witnessed them live on TV.
我要感谢亚洲协会和夏伟（Orville Schell)给我这样一个精彩的机会。
尼克松总统1972年与毛泽东主席和周恩来总理会面的画面深深地印在那些通过亲眼目睹实况的美国人的脑海里。
As a staffer in Dr. Kissinger’s National Security Council, it was a great thrill for me to have been involved in the preparation for, and the follow-up to, that historic meeting. And it is an equally great privilege to still be working on advancing the U.S.-China economic relationship as Under Secretary of State some 40 years later.
我当时作为基辛格博士（Dr. Kissinger）的国家安全委员会的工作人员，能为这个历史性会见做事先和随后进程的准备，感到极其兴奋。而且同样荣幸的是，能够作为副国务卿在40年后仍继续从事推进美中经济关系的工作。
Over this period, in my many visits to China, I have observed, and been privileged to be modestly engaged in several aspects of one of the truly great historic events of the 20th Century – the resurgence of this great society and great people.
在此期间，在我对中国的多次访问中，我观察并有幸从几方面稍微接触到20世纪真正伟大的历史事件之一——这个伟大社会和伟大人民的重新崛起。
At the time President Nixon made his visit to Beijing, the focus was primarily strategic in nature. For the U.S., it was very much part of our effort to strengthen our negotiating position vis-à-vis North Vietnam. For China, and for the U.S., it counterbalanced what was seen to be a growing Soviet military threat to China.
当尼克松总统访问北京的时候，焦点是战略性的。对美国来说，主要是为了加强我们和北越谈判的立场。对中国，也对美国来说，这是为了抗衡当时所认为的苏联对中国日益增强的军事威胁。
Hard as it may be to believe today, the opportunity to expand economic ties actually was very low on the list of priorities for either the U.S. or China.
虽然今天很难相信，但在当时，不管对美国还是中国，扩大经济联系的机会远非当务之急。
Today, when we reflect on the many trade, financial, and business ties we have with China, it is easy to forget how difficult it was to get started.
Prior to the Nixon White House, there was no commercial relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Tonight, I want to focus on how far the U.S.-China economic relationship has progressed since then.
今天，在思考我们与中国的多种贸易、金融和商业联系时，很容易忘记起步曾是多么困难。
尼克松入主白宫之前，美国和中华人民共和国之间没有商业关系。
今晚，我希望重点谈谈美中经济关系自那时以来取得了多么长足的进展。
And I also want to focus on some ways to advance U.S.-China economic relations over the next 40 years.
While it was primarily geopolitics and the externally driven pressures of the Cold War that helped push China and the United States together 40 years ago, many of the top subjects in the relationship today are economic.
我还希望重点谈谈促进美中经济关系未来40年发展的一些途径。
虽然40年前主要是地缘政治和冷战带来的外部压力促使中国和美国走到一起，但在今天，这个关系的许多重要方面却是经济性的。
And while 40 years ago China’s economic policies were of little or no consequence to our domestic economy – nor did our economic policies have any effect on theirs – today the situation is very different.
虽然40年前，中国的经济政策对我们的国内经济很少或根本没有任何影响——我们的经济政策对他们也没有任何影响——今天的情况截然不同。
What we see when we look at the sweep of events over the last couple of decades is that economic power often rivals or exceeds military power as a source of influence. Indeed in the case of China, its status of a major global power has been established more by its economic influence than by is military strength – a very different situation from previous countries that became great powers.
回首过去几十年所发生的各种事件让我们看到，经济实力的影响力往往和军事实力旗鼓相当或者更大。事实上，就中国而言，其作为全球主要大国的地位更多是基于它的经济影响力而不是军事实力——与以前一些成为强国的情况非常不同。
And while the United States and China share a great many common interests – and the relationship has produced a significant number of mutual benefits – we must also candidly recognize the several areas on which our positions diverge and where we do not prioritize the same values.
尽管美国和中国有大量的共同利益——这个关系带来了大量互惠互利——我们也必须坦率地承认，我们在几个方面立场分歧，我们的价值重点有所不同。
To address differences, and build on common interests, our economic relations over the next 40 years may well have to be framed differently in important respects than in the past 40 years.
为了解决分歧，继续发展共同利益，对未来40年经济关系的一些重要方面可能要有不同的架构。
The U.S. must continue to strongly assert our core economic positions in such areas as intellectual property rights, trade secrets protection and the necessity of a level playing field and non-discrimination in trade, innovation and investment.
美国必须继续坚决维护我们在下列方面的核心经济立场：知识产权、保护商业秘密、需要公平竞争和在贸易、创新和投资中不带歧视性。
But in so doing, we will probably achieve most progress in these and other areas if we frame our positions where possible in ways that dovetail, and are consistent with, the objectives China has set for itself. And attempt to make common cause with those in China who seek bolder reforms of the type we also advocate in their nation's own interests.
但在这样做的时候，如果我们以可能的方式使我们的立场与中国为自己制定的目标相互吻合一致，我们就可能在这些领域和其他领域取得最大的进展，并且努力和那些在中国寻求更大胆的改革的人们合作，为了他们自身国家利益，这种改革也是我们所主张的。
One aim should be to encourage provinces and cities that want to distinguish themselves by creating better living standards and more jobs for their people to compete with one another to adopt world class standards on intellectual property and treatment of investment.
一个目标应该是，鼓励那些希望在提高生活水平和为人民创造更多就业机会方面作出成就的省、市彼此竞争，以采纳世界一流的知识产权和投资待遇标准。
The 12th Five Year Plan includes some policy measures that would benefit China and the United States as well.
For example, as was announced during the recent visit of Vice President Xi Jinping, China will intensify its structural tax reduction policies, including making adjustments in import tariffs to increase consumption, accelerate development of the services sector, and actively expand imports.
第12个五年计划包含的一些政策将对中国和美国都有益。
例如，最近中国国家副主席习近平访美时宣布，中国将加强其结构性减税政策，包括对进口税进行调整以促进消费、加速发展服务业并积极扩大进口。
Another example is that China already is acting in some ways to improve its intellectual property rights protection.
I also was encouraged by China’s decision to establish a State Council-level leadership structure, led by Vice Premier Wang Qishan, to lead and coordinate IPR enforcement, as well as by President Hu Jintao’s remarks at the APEC CEO Summit in November when he said China would “step up protection of intellectual property rights and make China a country driven by innovation.”
另一个例子是，中国已经采取某些行动来改进对知识产权的保护。
另一个令我感到鼓舞的是，中国决定建立国务院一级的领导结构，由王歧山副总理负责领导并协调知识产权工作的实施；胡锦涛主席在去年11月的亚太经合组织企业领袖峰会（APEC CEO Summit）的讲话中表示，中国将加强对知识产权的保护，使中国成为一个由创新带动的国家。
We also need to underscore that many of the changes we are asking of China are not simply bilateral issues. They are in the interest of large numbers of other nations, including many of China's Asian neighbors and its BRICS colleagues.
我们还需要强调，我们目前要求中国作出的许多改变所涉及的并不仅是双边问题，它们也符合其他许多国家的利益，包括中国的许多亚洲邻国，以及与其同属“金砖四国”（BRICS）的国家。
Hence, we will need to work with these emerging countries, as well as supporters of the global economic system in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, to strengthen and broaden adherence to the global rules in areas such as trade, intellectual property, investment, raw materials, and open sea lanes. The broader and deeper the global support for such rules, the more comprehensive and compelling the argument for China to subscribe.
因此，我们需要与这些新兴国家以及支持全球经济系统的欧洲、拉丁美洲、中东和非洲国家共同努力，在贸易、知识产权保护、投资、原材料和公海航道等领域中加强并扩大遵守全球规范。对这些规则的全球支持越广泛、越深入，使中国认同这些规则的理由就越全面、越有说服力。
I. Little Early Interest in U.S.-China Trade
To begin, we need to look back to the U.S.-China relationship in 1970 and 1971.
Prior to President Nixon’s visit, there was little appetite in either China or the United States to even discuss the bilateral economic relationship.
Chinese Ambassador Xiong Xianghui once told two of my NSC colleagues, John Holdridge and Dick Solomon that China had “no interest” in trade relations with the outside world, including the United States.
一．早年美中贸易兴趣微乎其微
首先，我们需要重温一下1970年及1971年的美中关系。
在尼克松总统访华之前，无论中国还是美国，对即使讨论双边经济关系都几乎毫无兴趣。
中国大使熊向晖曾告诉我在美国国家安全委员会的同事约翰•霍尔德里奇（John Holdridge）和迪克•所罗门（Dick Solomon），中国对于与包括美国在内的外部世界发展贸易关系“毫无兴趣”。
And even when there was genuine interest, there were a host of very practical difficulties to opening U.S.-China trade, including existing U.S. restrictions on doing business with China.
Prior to the visit, the Nixon Administration undertook a number of practical steps to signal to China our desire for closer trade relations, principally to improve political ties.
即使在有真正的兴趣时，打开美中贸易大门也存在着一系列非常实际的困难，包括美国当时存在的种种对华贸易限制。
在访华之前，尼克松政府采取了数项实际步骤向中国发出信号，表示我们希望与中国发展更为密切的贸易关系，主要是出于改善政治关系的需要。
• In April 1971, President Nixon announced a five-point program to relax trade and travel restrictions, including a pledge to expedite the issuance of visas to PRC nationals wishing to visit the United States, a relaxation of currency controls to allow China to use American dollars, and the removal of restrictions prohibiting American oil companies from providing fuel to Chinese merchant ships.
1971年4月，尼克松总统宣布了一个“五点”计划，放宽贸易与旅行限制，包括保证加快中国公民来美签证的核发；放宽货币控制以使中国能够使用美元；取消禁止美国石油公司为中国商船提供燃料的限制。
• In June 1971, President Nixon lifted a 21-year-old embargo against trade with China to allow selected exports to China and the import of goods from China. He also terminated the requirement that half of the shipment of grain and flour to Communist nations must be carried in American ships.
1971年6月，尼克松总统解除了针对中国的历时21年的贸易禁运，允许某些商品向中国出口或从中国进口。他还终止了一项对共产主义国家的粮食与面粉出口必须有二分之一由美国船只运输的规定。
When Nixon visited China in February 1972, however, there still was little focus on economic relations.
In the middle of the Shanghai Communique, there were only two sentences on economic issues:
“Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.”
然而，当尼克松于1972年2月访问中国时，对于美中经济关系的关注微乎其微。
在上海公报（Shanghai Communique）中，只有两句话提到经济问题：
“双方把双边贸易看作是另一个可以带来互利的领域，并一致认为平等互利的经济关系是符合两国人民的利益的。他们同意为逐步发展两国间的贸易提供便利。”
Whether because of lack of attention due to their understandable subservience to strategic issues or because of the practical difficulties that had to be overcome, our economic policies towards China at the time were relatively modest.
无论是由于可以理解的相对于战略问题的从属位置，还是因为存在需要克服的实际困难，我们当时对中国的经济政策比较有限。
One of our earliest measures was to allow American travelers to bring back to the U.S. $100 in Chinese goods – but only if they were not purchased in China (e.g., were bought in Hong Kong). It also proved enormously complicated to unravel the myriad US export control regulations and other restrictions that had begun during the Korean War and accumulated over decades.
我们所采取的最早措施之一是，允许美国旅行者带回价值100美元的中国产品，但这些物品不得是在中国购买的（例如，在香港购买）。而且事实证明，解除在朝鲜战争（Korean War）时开始实施、经数十年积累起来的无数美国出口控制规章与限制是件极其复杂的工作。
II. Slow But Steady Post-Visit Progress
Soon after the visit, the NSC staff began to explore further expanding these fledgling economic ties.
My colleague on the NSC staff, the late John Holdridge, and I produced a memorandum on recommendations for a working group on trade issues.
Cautioning against getting caught up in unrealistic excitement over the China market, we recommended a series of actions the two sides could take in order to gradually reduce obstacles to trade.
二. 访问后缓慢而持续的进展
在访问后不久，国家安全委员会工作人员便开始探索如何扩大这些开始起步的经济联系。
我和国家安全委员会的一位同事，已故的约翰•霍尔德里奇，提交了一份备忘录，建议成立一个贸易问题工作小组。
我们谨慎地避免对中国市场产生不切实际的兴奋，建议采取一系列双方都能采取的行动，逐步减少贸易障碍。
We outlined a set of economic issues that would have to be dealt with, including:
1. the resolution of outstanding claims by U.S. citizens against China, and by Chinese citizens on assets frozen in the United States,
2. the question of “Most Favored Nation Status,”
3. travel between the two countries,
4. industrial and intellectual property protections, and
5. the expansion of mutual knowledge of what each country had to offer the other.
我们列出了必须得到处理的一系列经济问题，其中包括：
1．解决美国公民现有的针对中国的索赔要求，以及中国公民要求解冻在美国的资产的问题，
2． “最惠国地位”（“Most Favored Nation Status”）问题，
3．两国之间旅行问题，
4．工业和知识产权保护问题，
5．针对彼此能够为对方做些什么增进相互了解。
In early 1973, I was asked by Dr. Kissinger to get the private sector – which to date had had virtually no contact with China – more engaged. Commerce Secretary Fred Dent and I worked with the business community to establish the “National Council for United States-China Trade.”
1973年初，基辛格博士要求我设法让私营行业有更多参与——当时它们与中国几乎没有任何接触。商务部长弗雷德•登特（Fred Dent）和我与工商界一道努力，成立了“美中贸易全国委员会”（National Council for United States-China Trade）。
That organization changed its name in 1988 to the U.S.-China Business Council. It now has offices in Washington, Beijing, and Shanghai, and represents approximately 240 companies.
By the end of the decade, President Carter’s decision to normalize diplomatic relations with China, as well as Deng Xiaoping’s decision to push for domestic economic reforms, and his “kai fang” strategy of opening China to the world, worked in concert to produce a rapid increase in trade.
该组织于1988年改名为U.S.-China Business Council（中文译名仍为美中贸易全国委员会）。现在，它在华盛顿、北京和上海设有办事处，代表约240家公司。70年代末，卡特总统决定与中国实现外交关系正常化，同时邓小平决定推动国内经济改革并实施中国向世界“开放”战略，这些共同带动了贸易的迅速发展。
III. Period of Rapid Growth in Economic Ties
As everyone in this audience knows, the pace of progress since 1980 has been dramatic.
China’s economic reforms in the 1980s opened its market to foreign investment, allowed entrepreneurs to establish private businesses, launched agricultural reforms, lifted price controls, and closed many state-owned companies.
三. 经济联系迅速增长时期
在座的每个人都知道，自1980年以来的进展速度是惊人的。
中国在二十世纪八十年代实行的经济改革为外国投资打开市场、允许企业家建立私营工商业、启动农业改革、解除价格管制、并关闭了许多国有企业。
At the same time, Deng Xiaoping and President Carter also laid the groundwork for promoting people-to-people exchanges.
Deng fully recognized the impact such exchanges would have on the pace of reform. I can recall one conversation with him in China in which, with great conviction, he stated, “Just wait – we have 10,000 students abroad – when they come home, they’ll change China.”
与此同时，邓小平和卡特总统还为促进人文交流奠定了基础。
邓小平充分认识到这类交流将对改革步伐产生的影响。我还记得同他在中国进行的一次对话，他非常有信心地说：“请等着看——我们现在有一万名留学生在国外——等他们回国后，他们将改变中国。”
It was a radical move at the time to allow so many Chinese to study in the West, particularly in the U.S., but the policy paid enormous dividends.
Later, under Premier Zhu Rongji’s leadership, China enacted another set of economic reforms in an effort to qualify to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), ultimately acceding in 2001.
在当时，让这么多的中国人去西方学习、尤其是去美国学习，是一项大胆的举动。但这项政策获得了巨大回报。
后来，在朱镕基总理的领导下，中国实施了另一批经济改革措施，以便达到加入世界贸易组织（WTO）的资格要求，并最终于2001年获准加入该组织。
It’s important to highlight here that both Deng and Zhu understood that China would derive enormous benefits from being a full participant in the international economic system. And they deftly used the pressure and leverage of global rules and norms to accelerate market-oriented change in China.
有必要在这里强调指出，无论是邓小平还是朱镕基都了解，中国成为国际经济体系中全面参与的一员将给中国带来巨大利益。他们巧妙地利用全球规则与规范的压力与作用，加速中国以市场为导向的改革。
IV. The Dramatic Numbers
The economic changes since the 1972 Nixon visit, as well the progress in the U.S.-China economic relationship, have been nothing short of breathtaking:
• In 1972, U.S.-China two-way trade in goods was a mere $95.9 million. By 1985 – just a few years after Deng’s reform and opening – this volume had increased more than 70-fold to $7 billion.
四. 惊人的数字
自1972年尼克松访问以来发生的经济变化以及美中经济关系的发展，用令人惊人不已来形容毫不为过：
• 1972年，美中双向货物贸易仅有区区9590万美元。到1985年——邓小平实行改革与开放仅仅数年后，贸易量增加70多倍，达到70亿美元。
• In the 25 years between 1985 and 2010, two-way trade in goods increased from $7 billion to $365 billion.
• And U.S. goods exports to China reached $103.9 billion in 2011 –a more than 25-fold increase, from the $3.9 billion of exports to China in1985.
在1985年到2010年的25年内，双向货物贸易从70亿美元增加到3650亿美元。
在2011年，美国向中国的商品出口达到1039亿美元——与1985年对中国出口的39亿美元相比，增长超过25倍。
To give you an illustration of how far we’ve come, before 1971-72, U.S. exports of aircraft and locomotives to China were prohibited. But during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in January 2011, we were able to announce deals for Boeing to sell 200 aircraft to China for an estimated $19 billion and GE Transportation to sign a $1.4 billion contract with China’s Ministry of Railways, including $350 million for export of locomotives, sub-assembly, services support, and signaling systems.
给大家举例说明我们取得了多么长足的进展：在1971年到72之前, 美国禁止向中国出口飞机和火车机车。但2011年1月在胡锦涛主席访问华盛顿时，我们宣布的交易包括，波音公司（Boeing）将向中国出售200架飞机，价值约达190亿美元；通用电气运输集团（GE Transportation）将与中国铁道部签署 14亿美元的合同，其中包括出口价值3亿5千万美元的火车机车、半组装产品、售后服务和信号系统。
But despite breathtaking progress, the U.S. and China still have many obstacles to overcome.
And therefore, I believe this 40th anniversary of the Nixon visit allows us not only to reflect on the past but also to contemplate how we can move forward based on lessons learned from it.
但是，尽管取得惊人的进展，美国和中国仍存在许多有待克服的障碍。
因此，我认为尼克松访问40周年之际让我们不仅回顾过去，而且思考如何能够汲取过去的经验继续向前发展。
V. A New Opportunity for Reform and Opening?
Looking ahead to the next 40 years, we have an opportunity to shape the future global economic system for the benefit of both our countries and the world.
And I should add here that it is not only our relationship with China that will shape the global economy in the years to come but also our growing engagement with Asia as a whole through APEC and our ties with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and the Trans Pacific Partnership.
五．改革开放的新机遇？
展望下一个40年，我们有机会塑造一个有益于美中两国和整个世界的未来全球经济体系。
在这里，我要补充一句，在未来年代里，塑造全球经济的不仅是我们与中国的关系，而且还有我们与整个亚洲日益增长的关系——通过亚太经合组织（APEC）和我们与东盟（ASEAN）、日本、韩国的关系以及跨太平洋伙伴关系（Trans Pacific Partnership）。
Our goal in each case is to strengthen mutual commitments to the global system of market oriented rules, practices and norms that are open, free, transparent, and fair.
By reinforcing and strengthening high-standard global practices, we also discourage more nationalistic domestic standards, regulations, and restrictions that some countries – China among them – too often see as an attractive model for their economies.
在每种情况下，我们的目标都是加强共同承诺，致力于一个基于市场导向的规则、行为方式和规范的开放、自由、透明和公平的全球体系。
通过巩固和加强高标准的全球行为方式，我们可以阻止更为民族主义性的国内标准、规章和限制手段，它们被一些国家——包括中国在内——过分视为其自身经济的可取模式。
When we look more closely at what is going on inside China, I would offer that – just as was highlighted by the World Bank in its “China 2030” report released last week – China will need to pursue a new round of reforms to continue to transform its economy.
如果我们更仔细地观察一下中国国内正在发生的情况，我认为，中国将需要实行新一轮的改革以继续改观其经济，正像世界银行（World Bank）上周发表的《中国2030年》（China 2030）报告所强调的一样。
What served to enable dramatic improvements over the last 40 years – producing a spectacular rise in the living standards of hundreds of millions of people and in China's overall economic growth – may not be the kinds of policies or practices that will do so over the next forty.
曾使中国在过去40年中取得令人印象深刻的成就——给亿万人民的生活水平和中国整体经济增长带来惊人提高——的那些政策和措施，可能不能在未来40年创造同样效果。
Chinese leaders of the past recognized that institutionalizing internal reforms to better comply with the main requirements of international institutions was in their interest. China today needs to recognize that it has a similar interest in further adjusting its domestic practices to conform with both the letter and spirit of the current global system, rather than attempting to carve out exceptions or to take advantage of gray areas by engaging in practices that are inconsistent with global norms and rules, even if they are not technically WTO illegal, when it serves China’s short-term goals.
以往的中国领导人认识到，将内部改革制度化以更好地与国际体系的要求接轨符合他们的利益。今天的中国需要认识到，同样符合他们利益的是，要进一步调整其国内措施使之从字面上和实质上均与当前的全球体系接轨，而不是在有利于中国的短期目标时，试图设置例外或利用灰色区域，采取不符合全球标准与规则的做法——即便从技术意义上说没有违背世贸组织法律。
More than most countries, China should see the long-term benefits of reforms that recognize – as Zhu and Deng did – that adapting internally to many of the elements of the market-oriented, rules-based international system can be good for growth and economic vitality in China.
较之于多数国家，中国更应该看到改革将带来的长期利益，如同朱镕基和邓小平所做的那样，认识到使国内体系适应于市场导向、基于规则的国际体系的很多要素对中国的经济增长和活力是有好处的。
Initiatives to encourage Beijing to play a full-throated, constructive role in the global system will be most effective when they are framed in a way that clearly relates to China's own interests. One example is the highly positive role China played in the G-20 in managing the recent international financial crisis.
鼓励北京在全球体系中发挥强有力的建设性作用的各种倡议，放在一个与中国本身利益明确相连的构架中来表达最为有效。中国在处理最近国际金融危机的二十国集团（G-20）中所发挥的极其积极的作用就是一例。
The most astute U.S. approach would be to anticipate (rather than resist) China becoming richer and more powerful – and encourage it to recognize that adhering to global rules and norms is not incompatible with this process but in fact will enhance it and ensure its sustainability.
美国可以采取的最聪明的做法就是期待（而非抗拒）中国正在变得更加富有、更加强大，并促使它认识到，遵守全球规则和规范与这一进程并不矛盾，而且其实将会促进这一进程，并确保其可持续性。
This applies not only to economic policy but also to environmental policy. China’s skyrocketing demand for water and other natural resources, and its adverse impact on the country’s environment, are damaging the health and well-being of its own people and the global environment; and its voracious appetite for energy and other raw materials risks leading to destructive international competition for resources.
这种做法不仅适用于经济政策，也同样适用于环境政策。中国对水和其他自然资源飞速增长的需求及其对中国环境造成的负面影响，正在损害着其本国人民的健康和福祉以及全球环境；中国对能源和其他原料的渴求有可能导致对能源的有破坏力的国际争夺。
Better income distribution, less reliance on exports, greater efficiency in the use of natural resources, real competition that is not state-driven, non-discrimination in government procurement and investment policies, and a more efficient allocation of capital can all strengthen and sustain prosperity for greater numbers of Chinese and reduce economic tensions and imbalances with the rest of the world.
更合理地分配收入、减少对出口的依赖、更有效地利用自然资源、非由国家推动的真正的竞争、非歧视性的政府采购和投资政策以及更有效的资本分配——这一切都能给更多中国人带来和保持更大繁荣，减少与世界其他国家经济关系的紧张及失衡。
Framing our narrative in this context has considerable appeal to many Chinese.
While the broad Chinese model is conventionally termed “state capitalism,” because so much economic power is in the hands of state-owned and supported industry – and these sectors receive so much financial and other support – this is not the whole picture.
将我们的道理以这种方式表达颇受很多中国人欢迎。
中国的总体模式通常被称作“国家资本主义”，因为其经济实力在很大程度上掌握在国家拥有和支持的产业手中——这些部门获得大量的财政和其他支持，但是这并非全貌。
There are, in China, significant pockets of intense private sector competition, home-grown innovation and technical advances that do not depend on government support, and substantial numbers of people who would benefit from, and believe China would benefit from, all of the significant policy reforms I have just mentioned. We should engage with all of them, in addition to the national government.
中国存在着零散的很有意义的私营业的激烈竞争、不依赖政府支持的本土创新和技术进步，还有相当多的人将从我们刚才提到的重大政策改革中获益，并相信中国将从中获益。我们除了与中国政府接触之外，还应该与所有这些人接触。
VI. Policies for the Future
As I stated at the outset, whereas 40 years ago, geopolitics and the external environment pushed us together, many of the compelling priorities for the United States and China today are internal in nature – jobs, growth, the environment, social equity. We must find ways to ensure that U.S.-China relations support these internal objectives in both countries– and that one side does not seek to accomplish them at the others’ expense.
六．未来政策
如同我在一开始所说，40年前，地缘政治和外在环境促使我们走在一起；今天，美国和中国面临的许多迫切重要问题是来自国内，如就业、增长、环境、社会平等。我们必须设法确保美中关系能够支持双方的这些国内目标，并且不会以对方为代价来实现这些目标。
If we work together and avoid seeing our relationship as a zero-sum game, then mutual success is possible. If we do not, then success in each of our economies will be far more difficult.
There are a number of ways to advance U.S. economic relations with China, strengthen the American economy, and help China accomplish its own goals on domestic economic reform as well.
如果我们同心协力，避免使我们的关系陷入一场零和游戏，那么彼此都能够成功。如果我们不这样做，那么各自经济的成功都要困难得多。
有几种途径可以推动美国与中国的经济关系，强化美国经济，并且帮助中国实现国内经济改革的目标。
A few examples:
• Increasing Chinese investment in the United States would help balance our economies, contribute to domestic jobs and growth here, and support China’s more outward orientation. We need to encourage Chinese investment in the United States, and we’re doing so through Select USA, the U.S.-China Governors Forum.
举几个例子：
• 增进中国对美国的投资有助于平衡双方的经济，促进国内就业机会和增长，并且支持中国进一步向外开放。我们需要鼓励中国对美国的投资，并且正在通过选择美国（Select USA）和美中州/省长论坛（U.S.-China Governors Forum）等机制这样做。
But we also need to be sure that Chinese companies do not compete here or elsewhere using pirated intellectual property or by taking unfair advantage, utilizing subsidies and other government support they receive at home. Lifting restrictions on foreign investment in key sectors in China would also improve receptivity in the U.S. and in other nations. And throughout the world, Chinese investment will be more secure if it respects local cultures, as well as sound environmental practice, and promotes transparency as well as accountability. On this as on other issues, we should make common cause with other countries.
但是我们还需要确保中国公司在这里或其他地方竞争时，不会使用盗版知识产权，利用不公平优势，或者运用他们在本国获得的补贴和其他类型的政府支持。解除对外国在中国主要产业投资的限制，也会在美国和其他国家得到更多接受。在世界各地，如果尊重当地文化，采用良好的环境措施，并且提倡透明和问责，中国的投资也会得到更大保障。在这一点和其他问题上，我们应该与其他国家合作努力。
• Ramping up agricultural trade would lead to more U.S. exports and help China meet its food security needs. The U.S.-China Agricultural Symposium that was held in Iowa during Vice President Xi’s visit is an encouraging sign of progress in this area.
加强农业贸易会使美国有更多出口，并帮助中国满足粮食保障需要。中国国家副主席习近平访美期间在艾奥瓦州举行的美中农业研讨会（U.S.-China Agricultural Symposium），就是这方面一个令人鼓舞的进展迹象。
• Engaging China in the WTO and other multilateral institutions will remain critically important. China’s accession to the WTO has been good for China and for the world – but just as China insists that others abide by WTO rules, so should Beijing. More broadly, it will improve relations with many nations and the trade opportunities for its own companies if it avoids practices that – as I mentioned earlier – may not be strictly illegal under the WTO, but which are inconsistent with the organization’s principle of fairness and non-discrimination.
• 在世界贸易组织和其他多边机制同中国接触交流仍旧至关重要。中国加入世贸组织给中国和世界都带来了好处，但是，就像中国坚持要求其他国家遵守世贸组织规则一样，北京也必须同样这样做。更宏观地说，如果中国避免使用我在前面指出的做法——即虽然严格来说没有违反世贸组织的规定，但却与该组织的公平与不歧视的原则相左，那么中国将能增进与许多国家的关系以及中国自身公司的贸易机会。
• Encouraging “competitive neutrality” with respect to state-owned and state-supported enterprises will aid China’s own rebalancing efforts. We don’t argue with China’s desire to have SOEs, but often massive government support of these entities grossly distorts international and domestic competition. That ultimately harms not only foreign investors and exporters but many Chinese firms as well. As China seeks to boost the prospects of job creation in its private sector and especially in small and medium sized Chinese enterprises, such tactics are doubly harmful.
• 鼓励国有以及国家扶植的企业保持“竞争中立”，将有助于中国自身的再平衡努力。我们不会就中国希望拥有国有企业进行争论，但是政府对于这些实体的大量扶植却经常严重扭曲国际和国内竞争。这最终不只会伤害外国投资者和出口商，而且也会伤害中国公司。随着中国致力在本国私营业增加就业机会，特别是在中国的中小企业，这种做法造成双倍伤害。
• Insisting that China maintain an environment for innovation that respects intellectual property rights and trade secrets – and is non-discriminatory. This will benefit Chinese innovators and American companies as well. It will also allow closer collaboration and greater trust between Chinese and many foreign companies. If China expects – and it should – its growing body of intellectual property to be protected around the world, it must protect foreign intellectual property in China, not only at the national level but in the provinces and among SOEs as well.
• 坚持要求中国保持一个尊重知识产权和贸易机密并且不实行歧视的创新环境。这对中国创新者和美国公司都有好处。它还会促进中国与许多外国公司之间更密切的合作和更大的信任。如果中国期待——而它理当如此——其日益增加的知识产权能够在世界受到保护，它就必须保护在中国的外国知识产权，不只在国家层次，也在省级和国有企业层次。
• Because large amounts of U.S. food, drug, and other U.S. imports come from China, cooperation in product safety can promote the health of citizens in both our countries. We have made excellent progress through the FDA and other agencies. And we have major multilateral efforts underway through institutions such as APEC. But we need to do more together and China needs to do more to enhance its reputation as a safe supplier.
• 由于大量的美国食品、药物和其他美国进口产品是来自中国，产品安全方面的合作可以增进两国公民的健康。我们已经通过食品和药物管理局（FDA）和其他机构取得极好的进展。我们也已通过亚太经合组织之类的机制进行多边努力。但是我们需要加强彼此合作，中国也需要作出更多努力，提升作为安全供应商的声誉。
• Collaborating on the environment, clean water and climate change by fostering exchanges of scientists and policymakers can combat environmental degradation in China, as well as global climate change. It will also help China to address the problems of social instability and ill health that its enormous reliance on coal and other major CO2 emitters produce. (The GE Ecoimagination program – for which I attended the Southwest China launch in Chengdu last fall – is a great example of clean energy collaboration with the private sector.)
• 通过促进科学家和决策者的交流在环境、清洁水和气候变化领域进行协作，有助于应对中国的环境恶化以及全球的气候变化。它也有助于中国处理由于大幅依赖煤炭和其他主要二氧化碳排放源所带来的社会不稳定和健康问题。（GE绿色创想[GE Ecoimagination]项目——去年秋季我在成都参加了它在中国西南的启动——就是与私营行业在清洁能源上开展合作的一个好例子）。
• Bringing together Chinese and American governors, provincial and municipal leaders to collaborate on economic, energy, and environmental issues – and boost commercial opportunities – can provide a series of mutual benefits, including boosting American exports to China and encouraging Chinese investment in the U.S.
• 让中国和美国省长州长和省级市级领导人走到一起，就经济、能源和环境议题开展合作——并且促进商机——可以带来一系列的共同利益，包括促进美国向中国出口和鼓励中国在美国投资。
VII. Conclusion
Since President Nixon’s historic visit to China, there has been bipartisan support for closer U.S.-China relations – despite a series of ups and downs in the relationship. It is important that regardless of what differences arise, that tradition be maintained.
七．总结
自从尼克松总统历史性的访华之旅后，尽管两国关系曾有起伏，但是发展更密切的美中关系一直得到两党支持。不论出现什么歧异都保持这一传统是非常重要的。
It is also important to recognize that however much China changes in the directions the U.S. wants, and however well we continue our efforts to forge mutually beneficial economic ties in the years ahead, the key to a strong American economy lies in our own hands.
同样重要的是要认识到，不论中国朝着美国希望的方向做出多少改变，也不论我们多么持续努力在未来发展有利双方的经济纽带，美国经济繁荣的关键掌握在我们自己手里。
The more dynamic, innovative and resilient the American private sector – and the greater the capacity of our political system to address the fiscal, infrastructure, educational and energy needs of the country – the more successful will be the U.S. response to China's competitive challenge. And the more credible the U.S. economic model will be other nations. We will also be more credible in obtaining support in China and elsewhere in the world for the kind of market-oriented, rules-based system we led the way in constructing.
美国的私营行业越有动力、创新和弹性——并且我们的政治体系越有能力应对全国的财政、基础设施、教育和能源需求——美国就越能成功地应对与中国的竞争挑战。美国的经济模式也会对其他国家更加可信。在我们为我们带头创建的以市场为导向、以规则为依据的体系争取中国和世界各地的支持时，也会更加可信。
Much of the future of the world in the 21st Century will depend on how well China and the U.S. sustain growth in their own economies, manage their relationship with one another, and together address challenges facing the global economy. If we can successfully strengthen this evermore complex and important relationship, and capitalize on the opportunities it presents while narrowing our differences, both countries will be better for it, just as they were following the Nixon visit 40 years ago.
二十一世纪世界的未来在很大程度上有赖中国和美国如何保持各自经济的增长，处理彼此的关系，并且合力解决全球经济面临的挑战。如果我们能够成功强化这个日益复杂而重要的关系，并且在缩小彼此的歧异同时利用它提供的机遇，两国都能更强盛，就像跟随尼克松40年前访华的脚步一样。
天之聪教育
2012-08-17
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