In Arab Spring, Obama Finds a Sharp Test

WASHINGTON — President Hosni Mubarak did not even wait for President Obama’s words to be translated before he shot back.

“You don’t understand this part of the world,” the Egyptian leader broke in. “You’re young.”

Mr. Obama, during a tense telephone call the evening of Feb. 1, 2011, had just told Mr. Mubarak that his speech, broadcast to hundreds of thousands of protesters in Tahrir Square in Cairo, had not gone far enough. Mr. Mubarak had to step down, the president said.

Minutes later, a grim Mr. Obama appeared before hastily summoned cameras in the Grand Foyer of the White House. The end of Mr. Mubarak’s 30-year rule, Mr. Obama said, “must begin now.” With those words, Mr. Obama upended three decades of American relations with its most stalwart ally in the Arab world, putting the weight of the United States squarely on the side of the Arab street.

It was a risky move by the American president, flying in the face of advice from elders on his staff at the State Department and at the Pentagon, who had spent decades nursing the autocratic — but staunchly pro-American — Egyptian government.

Nineteen months later, Mr. Obama was at the State Department consoling some of the very officials he had overruled. Anti-American protests broke out in Egypt and Libya. In Libya, they led to the deaths of four Americans, including the United States ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens. A new Egyptian government run by the Muslim Brotherhood was dragging its feet about condemning attacks on the American Embassy in Cairo.

Television sets in the United States were filled with images of Arabs, angry over an American-made video that ridiculed the Prophet Muhammad, burning American flags and even effigies of Mr. Obama.

Speaking privately to grieving State Department workers, the president tried to make sense of the unfolding events. He talked about how he had been a child abroad, taught to appreciate American diplomats who risked their lives for their country. That work, and the outreach to the Arab world, he said, must continue, even in the face of mob violence that called into question what the United States can accomplish in a turbulent region.

In many ways, Mr. Obama’s remarks at the State Department two weeks ago — and the ones he will make before the General Assembly on Tuesday morning, when he addresses the anti-American protests — reflected hard lessons the president had learned over almost two years of political turmoil in the Arab world: bold words and support for democratic aspirations are not enough to engender good will in this region, especially not when hampered by America’s own national security interests.

In fact, Mr. Obama’s staunch defense of democracy protesters in Egypt last year soon drew him into an upheaval that would test his judgment, his nerve and his diplomatic skill. Even as the uprisings spread to Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, the president’s sympathy for the protesters infuriated America’s allies in the conservative and oil-rich Gulf states. In mid-March, the Saudis moved decisively to crush the democracy protests in Bahrain, sending a convoy of tanks and heavy artillery across the 16-mile King Fahd Causeway between the two countries.

That blunt show of force confronted Mr. Obama with the limits of his ability, or his willingness, to midwife democratic change. Despite a global outcry over the shooting and tear-gassing of peaceful protesters in Bahrain, the president largely turned a blind eye. His realism and reluctance to be drawn into foreign quagmires has held sway ever since, notably in Syria, where many critics continue to call for a more aggressive American response to the brutality of Bashar al-Assad’s rule.

Mr. Obama’s journey from Cairo to the Causeway took just 44 days. In part, it reflected the different circumstances in the countries where protests broke out, despite their common origins and slogans. But his handling of the uprisings also demonstrates the gap between the two poles of his political persona: his sense of himself as a historic bridge-builder who could redeem America’s image abroad, and his more cautious adherence to long-term American interests in security and cheap oil.

To some, the stark difference between the outcomes in Cairo and Bahrain illustrates something else, too: his impatience with old-fashioned back-room diplomacy, and his corresponding failure to build close personal relationships with foreign leaders that can, especially in the Middle East, help the White House to influence decisions made abroad.

A Focus on Respect

In many ways, Mr. Obama’s decision to throw American support behind change in the Arab world was made well before a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire and ignited the broadest political challenge to the region in decades.

Mr. Obama, whose campaign for the presidency was in part set in motion by his early opposition to the Iraq war, came into office determined that he would not repeat what he viewed as the mistakes of his predecessor in pushing a “freedom agenda” in Iraq and other parts of the Arab world, according to senior administration officials.

As large street protests broke out in Iran after disputed presidential elections, Mr. Obama followed a low-key script, criticizing violence but saying he did not want to be seen as meddling in Iranian domestic politics.

Months later, administration officials said, Mr. Obama expressed regret about his muted stance on Iran. “There was a feeling of ‘we ain’t gonna be behind the curve on this again,’ ” one senior administration official said. He, like almost two dozen administration officials and Arab and American diplomats interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity.

By the time the Tunisian protests broke out in January 2011 — an angry Mr. Obama accused his staff of being caught “flat-footed,” officials said — the president publicly backed the protesters. But the real test of the new muscular posture came 11 days later, when thousands of Egyptians converged on Tahrir Square in Cairo for a “day of rage.”

Mr. Obama felt keenly, one aide said, the need for the United States, and for he himself, to stand as a moral example. “He knows that the protesters want to hear from the American president, but not just any American president,” a senior aide to Mr. Obama said. “They want to hear from this American president.” In other words, they wanted to hear from the first black president of the United States, a symbol of the possibility of change.

If the president felt a kinship with the youthful protesters, he seems to have had little rapport with Egypt’s aging president, or, for that matter, any other Arab leaders. In part, this was a function of time: he was still relatively new to the presidency, and had not built the kind of cozy relationship that the Bush family, for instance, had with the Saudis.

But Mr. Obama has struggled with little success to build better relations with key foreign leaders like Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.

In any case, after an awkward phone call between the American and Egyptian presidents on Jan. 28, Mr. Obama sent a senior diplomat to make a personal appeal to the Egyptian leader. But Mr. Mubarak balked. Meanwhile, the rising anger in Cairo’s streets led to a new moment of reckoning for Mr. Obama: Feb. 1.

That afternoon at the White House, top national security officials were meeting in the Situation Room to decide what to do about the deteriorating situation in Egypt. Thirty minutes into it, the door opened and the president walked in, crashing what was supposed to be a principals’ meeting.

Attending were Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen; and the national security adviser, Tom Donilon. Margaret Scobey, the ambassador in Cairo, appeared on the video conference screen.

The question on the table would have been unthinkable just a week before. Should Mr. Obama call for Mr. Mubarak to step down?

Midway through the meeting, an aide walked in and handed a note to Mr. Donilon. “Mubarak is on,” he read aloud.

Every screen in the Situation Room was turned to Al Jazeera, and the Egyptian leader appeared, making a much-anticipated address. He said he would not run again, but did not offer to step down. “This is my country,” he said. “I will die on its soil.”

In the Situation Room, there was silence. Then the president spoke. “That’s not going to cut it,” he said.

Seeing the Inevitable

If this were Hollywood, the story of Barack Obama and the Arab Spring would end there, with the young American president standing with the protesters against the counsel of his own advisers, and hastening the end of the entrenched old guard in Egypt. In the Situation Room, Mr. Gates, Admiral Mullen, Jeffrey D. Feltman, then an assistant secretary of state, and others balked at the inclusion in Mr. Obama’s planned remarks that Mr. Mubarak’s “transition must begin now,” arguing that it was too aggressive.

Mr. Mubarak had steadfastly stood by the United States in the face of opposition from his own public, they said. The president, officials said, countered swiftly: “If ‘now’ is not in my remarks, there’s no point in me going out there and talking.”

John O. Brennan, chief counterterrorism adviser to Mr. Obama, said the president saw early on what others did not: that the Arab Spring movement had legs. “A lot of people were in a state of denial that this had an inevitability to it,” Mr. Brennan said in an interview. “And I think that’s what the president clearly saw, that there was an inevitability to it that would clearly not be turned back, and it would only be delayed by suppression and bloodshed.”

So “now” stayed in Mr. Obama’s statement. Ten days later, Mr. Mubarak was out. Even after the president’s remarks, Mrs. Clinton was still publicly cautioning that removing Mr. Mubarak too hastily could threaten the country’s transition to democracy.

In the end, many of the advisers who initially opposed Mr. Obama’s stance now give him credit for prescience. But there were consequences, and they were soon making themselves felt.

Angry Reactions

On Feb. 14, in the tiny island monarchy of Bahrain, Internet calls for a “day of rage” led to street rallies and bloody clashes with the police. The next day at a news conference in Washington, Mr. Obama seemed to suggest that this revolt was much like the others.

But in the following weeks, Mr. Obama fell silent. Away from the public eye, he was coming under assault from leaders in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, even Israel. Angry at the treatment of Mr. Mubarak, which officials from the Gulf states feared could forecast their own abandonment, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates drew a line in the sand. Some American and Arab diplomats say that response could have been avoided if Mr. Obama had worked quietly to ease Mr. Mubarak out, rather than going public.

On March 14, White House officials awoke to a nasty surprise: the Saudis had led a military incursion into Bahrain, followed by a crackdown in which the security forces cleared Pearl Square in the capital, Manama, by force. The moves were widely condemned, but Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton offered only veiled criticisms, calling for “calm and restraint on all sides” and “political dialogue.”

The reasons for Mr. Obama’s reticence were clear: Bahrain sits just off the Saudi coast, and the Saudis were never going to allow a sudden flowering of democracy next door, especially in light of the island’s sectarian makeup. Bahrain’s people are mostly Shiite, and they have long been seen as a cat’s paw for Iranian influence by the Sunni rulers of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In addition, the United States maintains a naval base in Bahrain that is seen as a bulwark against Iran, crucial for maintaining the flow of oil from the region.

“We realized that the possibility of anything happening in Saudi Arabia was one that couldn’t become a reality,” said William M. Daley, President Obama’s chief of staff at the time. “For the global economy, this couldn’t happen. Yes, it was treated differently from Egypt. It was a different situation.”

Some analysts credit Mr. Obama for recognizing early on that strategic priorities trumped whatever sympathy he had for the protesters. Others say the administration could have more effectively mediated between the Bahraini government and the largely Shiite protesters, and thereby avoided what has become a sectarian standoff in one of the world’s most volatile places.

If Mr. Obama had cultivated closer ties to the Saudis, he might have bought time for negotiations, according to one American diplomat who was there at the time. Instead, the Saudis gave virtually no warning when their forces rolled across the causeway linking Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and the ensuing crackdown destroyed all hopes for a peaceful resolution.

The tensions between Mr. Obama and the Gulf states, both American and Arab diplomats say, derive from an Obama character trait: he has not built many personal relationships with foreign leaders. “He’s not good with personal relationships; that’s not what interests him,” said one United States diplomat. “But in the Middle East, those relationships are essential. The lack of them deprives D.C. of the ability to influence leadership decisions.”

A Lack of Chemistry

Arab officials echo that sentiment, describing Mr. Obama as a cool, cerebral man who discounts the importance of personal chemistry in politics. “You can’t fix these problems by remote control,” said one Arab diplomat with long experience in Washington. “He doesn’t have friends who are world leaders. He doesn’t believe in patting anybody on the back, nicknames.

“You can’t accomplish what you want to accomplish” with such an impersonal style, the diplomat said.

Mr. Obama’s advisers argue that when he does reach out, he is more effective — as in a phone call last week to Mohamed Morsi, the new president of Egypt. After Mr. Morsi’s initial tepid response to the attacks on the embassy in Cairo, a fed-up Mr. Obama demanded a show of support. Within an hour, he had it.

Still, there remains concern in the administration that at any moment, events could spiral out of control, leaving the president and his advisers questioning their belief that their early support for the Arab Spring would deflect longstanding public anger toward the United States.

For instance, Mr. Feltman, the former assistant secretary of state, said, “the event I find politically most disturbing is the attack on Embassy Tunis.” Angry protesters breached the grounds of the American diplomatic compound there last week — in a country previously known for its moderation and secularism — despite Mr. Obama’s early support for the democracy movement there.  “That really shakes me out of complacency about what I thought I knew.”

 

 阿拉伯之春考验奥巴马 
 

华盛顿——埃及前总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)甚至还没等译者翻译完奥巴马总统的话就予以反击。

“你不了解这片土地，”埃及领导人打断说。“你还年轻。”

2011年2月1日晚间，奥巴马在紧张的电话会议中刚刚告知穆巴拉克，他对开罗解放广场数万名群抗议者发表的讲话，远远不够。总统表示，穆巴拉克必须下台。

几分钟后，奥巴马一脸严肃地出现在白宫大厅的摄影机前，许多记者被紧急召来参加发布会。奥巴马表示，在长达30年的统治之后，穆巴拉克“必须开始让位”。奥巴马的话表明，他决定断绝美国与其阿拉伯世界最忠实的盟友长达30年的关系，转而完全站在阿拉伯民众一边。

这是一个冒险举动，美国总统全然不顾国务院和五角大楼资深工作人员的建议，而正是这些官员几十年来一直扶植着这个坚定支持美国的埃及独裁政府。

19个月后，奥巴马在国务院安抚那些曾被他否决的官员。埃及和利比亚爆发了反美抗议活动。利比亚的抗议活动甚至导致包括美国驻利比亚大使J·克里斯托弗·史蒂文斯(J. Christopher Stevens)在内的四名美国人死亡。而穆斯林兄弟会(Muslim Brotherhood)控制的埃及新政府在谴责对美国驻开罗大使馆的攻击时行动缓慢。

美国的电视机里都是阿拉伯人的身影，他们对在美国制作的讥讽先知穆罕默德的视频表示愤怒，他们焚烧了美国国旗，甚至还有奥巴马的人像。

奥巴马总统在与悲伤中的国务院工作人员私下交谈时，试图搞清楚仍在发展中的事态。他谈到自己小时候在国外度过，被教育要感激那些为了国家而冒生命危险的美国外交人员。他表示，即使面对暴民暴动，外交工作以及美国与阿拉伯世界的交往都必须进行下去。这些暴动让人们质疑，美国在一个动荡地区能做到什么。

在许多方面，奥巴马两周前在国务院的讲话，以及他周二上午（指美东时间——编者注）在联合国大会(General Assembly)发表的演讲（其间他将谈到反美抗议问题），都反映了总统从近两年的阿拉伯世界政治动乱中汲取的沉痛教训：豪言壮语以及对民主抱负的支持，不足以在该地区催生善意，尤其是在美国受到自身国家安全利益的束缚时。

事实上，奥巴马去年坚决站在埃及民主抗议者一边的立场，很快就让他卷入一场剧变，使他的判断力、胆识以及外交技巧面临考验。随着起义蔓延至利比亚、也门、巴林和叙利亚，总统对抗议者的同情激怒了美国在保守却富油的海湾国家的盟友。3月中旬，沙特方面果断出手镇压巴林的民主抗议活动，派出一支坦克和重型火炮车队，浩浩荡荡开过连接两国的长达26公里的法赫德国王大桥。

这种直白的武力展示使奥巴马直面自己的局限性：他促进民主变革的能力和意愿都有限。虽然国际社会谴责巴林对和平抗议者开枪和施放催泪瓦斯的行为，但奥巴马基本上视而不见。从此之后，奥巴马总统的现实主义以及不愿陷入海外困境的意向占据主导地位，尤其是在叙利亚问题上。叙利亚的许多批评人士继续呼吁美国对巴沙尔·阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)的残暴统治作出更强有力的回应。

从埃及到巴林，奥巴马的态度转变花了44天。这在某种程度上反映出各国的国情不同，尽管这些抗议活动有着共同的起源和口号。但奥巴马总统对起义的处理方式也展示了他政治角色两极之间的落差：一是他认为自己是历史的搭桥者，可以挽回美国的海外形象；二是他更为谨慎的一面，即坚定维护美国在安全和廉价石油方面的长期利益。

对某些人来说，开罗和巴林两种截然不同的结果，还说明了另一个方面，那就是奥巴马厌烦老式的幕后外交，以及由此导致的他没能与外国领导人建立密切私人关系，特别是在中东地区，而此类关系本来会有助于白宫对外国的决策施加影响。

注重相互尊重

从许多方面来说，奥巴马做出美国将支持阿拉伯世界进行改革的决定，远远早于突尼斯街头小贩自焚从而引燃该地区数十年来最广泛的政治挑战。

据奥巴马政府的一些高级官员称，奥巴马竞选总统在某种程度上是由他从一开始就反对伊拉克战争所激发的。在他上任时，他决心不再重复在他眼里前任总统的错误决定，即在伊拉克和阿拉伯世界的其它地方推动“自由事业”。

在伊朗有争议的总统选举后爆发大规模街头抗议时，奥巴马保持低调。他批评了暴力，但表示他不想被视为干涉伊朗内政。

奥巴马政府的一些官员称，几个月后，奥巴马对自己在伊朗问题上的沉默立场表示后悔。一名高级官员说，“那时有一种‘我们不会再落后于形势’的情绪。”如同本文采访的20多名奥巴马政府官员以及阿拉伯和美国外交官一样，这名官员也要求匿名。

一些官员称，2011年1月突尼斯爆发抗议活动时（奥巴马曾愤怒地斥责他的幕僚“措手不及”），总统公开支持抗议者。但对奥巴马政府强硬新姿态的真正检验出现在11天之后，当时数以千计埃及人聚集在开罗解放广场，举行“愤怒之日”抗议活动。

一名助理称，奥巴马敏锐地感觉到，美国和他自己有必要站出来设立一个道德楷模。“他知道抗议者们想听到美国总统的声音，但不是任何一位美国总统。”奥巴马的一名高级助理表示，“他们想听到这位美国总统的声音。”换句话说，他们想听到美国首位黑人总统的声音，因为他象征着改变的可能性。

如果说总统觉得自己与年轻的抗议者有共同语言的话，那么他似乎与那位暮气沉沉的埃及总统（乃至其他任何一位阿拉伯领导人）几乎没有默契。在某种程度上，这与时间有关：他在任时间相对不长，而且没有建立起类似于布什家族和沙特王室之间那种亲密的关系。

但奥巴马一直未能与一些关键的外国领导人建立起更好的关系，例如阿富汗总统哈米德·卡尔扎伊(Hamid Karzai)和沙特阿拉伯国王阿卜杜拉(Abdullah)。

不管怎样，在1月28日美国总统与埃及总统进行一次尴尬的电话通话之后，奥巴马派出一名高级外交官向埃及领导人发出个人呼吁。但穆巴拉克犹豫不决。与此同时，开罗街头不断上升的愤怒，为奥巴马带来了2月1日这个新的“清算时刻”。

那天下午，国家安全高级官员在白宫的局势研究室召开会议，决定如何应对埃及日益恶化的局势。会开了30分钟时，门开了，总统走进来，闯入这个本来属于各部门主管的会议。

出席会议者包括副总统约瑟夫·R·拜登(Joseph R. Biden Jr.)、国务卿希拉里·罗德姆·克林顿(Hillary Rodham Clinton)、国防部长罗伯特·M·盖茨(Robert M. Gates)、参谋长联席会议主席、海军上将迈克尔·马伦(Mike Mullen)，以及国家安全顾问托马斯·多尼隆(Thomas Donilon)。在开罗的美国驻埃及大使玛格丽特·斯科比(Margaret Scobey)通过视频参加了会议。

会上讨论的问题即便在一周前也是无法想象的，那就是，奥巴马应当呼吁穆巴拉克下台么？

在会议期间，一名助手走进来，把一张纸条递给多尼隆。“穆巴拉克在电视上。”多尼隆大声读道。

局势研究室里的每个屏幕都被调到了半岛电视台(Al Jazeera)，埃及领导人穆巴拉克现身，发表了一篇备受期待的演说。他说，他不会再竞选了，但也不会提早下台。“这是我的国家，”他说。“我要死在这片土地上。”

局势研究室里一片寂静。然后，奥巴马总统开口说话。“这解决不了问题，”他说。

预见必然性

如果这是好莱坞电影，贝拉克·奥巴马和“阿拉伯之春”的故事到此将圆满落幕，这位年轻的美国总统置顾问们的意见于不顾，和抗议者站到了一边，加速了恋栈的埃及年老统治者的倒台。在局势研究室里，盖茨、马伦、时任助理国务卿杰弗里·D·费尔特曼(Jeffrey D. Feltman)，以及其他一些人，都对奥巴马讲稿中有关穆巴拉克的“过渡必须从现在就开始”的说法持保留意见，认为这么说过于咄咄逼人。

他们说，穆巴拉克曾在面临国内民众的反对时，仍坚定和美国站在一起。官员们称，总统当即反驳：“如果我在讲话中没有提到‘现在’，那我出面发表讲话就没有任何意义了。”

奥巴马的首席反恐顾问约翰·O·布伦南(John O. Brennan)说，总统预见到其他人没能预见的事情：“阿拉伯之春”运动是有后劲的。“很多人拒不承认这一切具有必然性，”布伦南在采访中表示。“而我认为，这正是总统所清晰看到的，这一切具有必然性，而且明显不可能被逆转，只会被镇压和杀戮推迟。”

所以“现在”一词就留在了奥巴马的声明中。10天后，穆巴拉克就下台了。甚至在总统发表讲话之后，国务卿克林顿还在公开场合告诫称，过于仓促地把穆巴拉克赶下台，可能危及埃及向民主政体的过渡。

最终，很多最初反对奥巴马立场的顾问，都承认他的预见是正确的。然而，这也是有后果的，这些后果很快就变得明显。

愤怒的反应

2月14日，在君主制的小型岛国巴林，互联网上发出的“愤怒之日”呼吁，发展为街头游行示威以及和警方的流血冲突。次日，在华盛顿的新闻发布会上，奥巴马似乎在表示这场反叛活动和中东其他国家的抗议相似。

然而，在接下来的几周中，奥巴马沉默了。公众视野之外，他受到了沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国，甚至还有以色列领导人的攻击。海湾国家的官员对穆巴拉克的遭遇感到愤怒，担心这预示着他们自己也会有同样的下场。于是，沙特和阿联酋划出了一条底线。美国和阿拉伯的一些外交官认为，如果奥巴马当初能够静悄悄地（而不是在公开场合）推动穆巴拉克下台，海湾国家就不会作出这样的反应。

3月14日早上，白宫官员获得了一条意外的坏消息：沙特阿拉伯对巴林进行了军事干预，之后，巴林军警用武力镇压抗议，对首都麦纳麦的珍珠广场(Pearl Square)进行清场。这些行动受到了广泛谴责，但奥巴马和克林顿只提出含蓄的批评，呼吁“各方要平静、克制”，要进行“政治对话”。

奥巴马不愿表态的原因很清楚：巴林就在沙特海岸外，沙特方面永远不会允许邻国突然绽放民主之花，尤其是考虑到巴林这个岛国的宗派构成。巴林人大部分是什叶派教徒，在沙特阿拉伯和巴林的逊尼派统治者眼里，这些人一直受伊朗影响的操控。此外，美国在巴林设有一处海军基地。这座基地被视为对抗伊朗的堡垒，对保障海湾地区的石油出口至关重要。

时任奥巴马总统幕僚长的威廉·M·戴利(William M. Daley)说，“我们意识到，在沙特阿拉伯出任何事的可能性都不能成为现实。为了全球经济，不能出这种事。没错，这里受到了与埃及不同的对待。情况不同。”

一些分析人士赞扬奥巴马一早就意识到，应当将战略优先事项置于他对抗议者的同情之上。另一些人则称，奥巴马政府本应更有效地在巴林政府和以什叶派为主的抗议者之间调停，从而避免在世界上最动荡的地区之一出现宗派对立。

根据当时在当地的一名美国外交官的说法，如果奥巴马之前与沙特方面打造了更紧密关系，他本来也许能够为谈判争取更多时间。但结果是，沙特在派出部队开过该国和巴林之间的大桥的时候，几乎没有给出警告，而随后的镇压摧毁了和平解决的所有希望。

美国和阿拉伯外交官均称，奥巴马和海湾国家之间的紧张源于奥巴马的一个性格特点：他没能与外国领导人建立很多私人关系。一名美国外交官说，“他不擅长私人关系；他对此不感兴趣。但在中东地区，这样的关系至关重要。缺乏私交使华盛顿丧失了影响领导层决策的能力。”

缺少火花

阿拉伯官员也呼应了这种说法，他们称奥巴马冷静而理性，不太看重私交在政治中的作用。拥有多年华盛顿经验的一名阿拉伯外交官说，“你不能靠遥控来解决这些问题。奥巴马没有与世界领导人交朋友。他不相信拍别人后背、叫昵称这样的事。”

这位外交官还说，这种排除个人因素的风格“不能让你达成你希望达成的事情。”

奥巴马的一些顾问辩称，当他真的采取主动的时候，他更加有效。上周给埃及新总统穆罕默德·穆尔西(Mohamed Morsi)打电话就是一例。开罗的美国大使馆遭到袭击之后，穆尔西最初的回应不疼不痒，奥巴马忍无可忍，打电话要求他展示出支持的态度。不到一小时后，奥巴马的要求就得到了满足。

然而，奥巴马政府仍然担忧，情况随时可能失控，使奥巴马及其顾问质疑自己的信念，即他们对“阿拉伯之春”的及早支持，将化解该地区公众长期存在的反美怒火。

 比如，前助理国务卿费尔特曼表示，“我觉得政治上最令人不安的是美国驻突尼斯大使馆遭到攻击。”尽管奥巴马很早就支持该国民主运动，但在这个之前以温和及世俗化闻名的国家，愤怒的抗议者上周突破了美国使馆大院的防线。“我本以为自己很懂，但这件事真的撼动了我的自信。”